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Abstract 
 
Fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts are 
commonly-used contract forms by clients in software 
outsourcing. The two parties, client and provider, usu-
ally renegotiate the testing time after system develop-
ment occurs. This research investigates the impacts of 
such renegotiation on the client’s contract choice. Our 
analysis shows that under both contract forms, rene-
gotiation can incentivize the provider’s effort, and this 
effect becomes more influential when the provider has 
higher bargaining power. Compared with a fixed-
price contract, a time-and-materials contract can 
stimulate the provider’s effort based on the terms for 
monitoring and reimbursement. The results suggest 
that when the provider has high bargaining power, the 
client will prefer a fixed-price contract. But when the 
provider has low bargaining power and the cost of 
monitoring is low, the client will prefer a time-and-
materials contract. When the provider has low bar-
gaining power and the cost of monitoring is high 
though, the client will prefer a fixed-price contract.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Software outsourcing has experienced tremendous 
growth over the last two decades [21] and Technavio’s 
analysts forecast the global IT outsourcing market to 
grow at a compound annual rate of 5.84% from 2014 
to 2019 [28]. In 2016, 951 software outsourcing con-
tracts worth USD 102.4 billion were signed worldwide 
[18]. In practice, the software outsourcing process is 
comprised of three stages: development, testing and 
maintenance. Practitioners recognize that software 
outsourcing consists of various uncertainties, such as 
the volatility of software code [19] and the transfor-
mation of IT landscape [24]. 
In software outsourcing, two kinds of contracts are 
commonly used between the client and the provider: 
fixed-price contracts and time-and-materials contracts 
[13]. A fixed-price contract consists of a predeter-
mined payment for system development, testing and 
maintenance services from the provider. Besides pay-
ment for the services of the provider, time-and-mate-
rials contracts include an extra fee for the provider’s 
effort, especially in system development. Due to the 
unobservability and non-contractibility of effort, in a 
time-and-materials contract, the client needs to moni-
tor the provider’s effort to determine the appropriate 
compensation for what it has done.  
Apart from contracts to activate the outsourcing 
process, due to the associated uncertainties, we also 
observe that the two parties usually renegotiate the 
system testing time after system development. For ex-
ample, the Kansas Department of Health and Environ-
ment signed a fixed-price contract with Accenture, and 
after the system was developed, they extended the con-
tract for five years to test and debug the system [22]. 
Also, the British Columbia, Canada. Ministry of 
Health signed a time-and-materials contract with IBM 
and revised the contractual terms around timeline and 
defect remediation, requiring IBM to resolve system 
bugs during testing.  
Renegotiation of testing time not only addresses 
the uncertainties in system development, but also af-
fects the provider’s development effort since testing 
time is mainly determined by the quality of the effort. 
Further, testing time is also a vital decision in software 
outsourcing to balance the trade-off between testing 
and maintenance costs after the system has been de-
veloped. If testing time is short, many critical bugs 
may remain undiscovered, which results in high 
maintenance cost, but prolonged testing leads to the 
delays in system release, which is costly as well. Ob-
servers suggest that in the fast-evolving IT market, a 
fixed-price contract with renegotiation is more appro-
priate [23]. However, nobody likes to renegotiate a 
contract with a provider [26] and so time-and-materi-
als contracts have become popular because they re-
duce the possibility of renegotiation [17].  
The above facts in software outsourcing pose in-
teresting challenges for the client: Which contract 
form should be chosen when the client renegotiates 
with the provider on testing time after system devel-
opment? To address the above question, we set up a 
multi-stage model in which a client outsources a cus-
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/60095
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Page 6612
tomized information system from an IT service pro-
vider. We examine two contract types – a fixed-price 
contract and a time-and-materials contract – and focus 
on the impacts of testing time renegotiation on the cli-
ent’s preference. 
Our analysis will show that, compared with a 
fixed-price contract, a time-and-materials contract can 
stimulate the provider’s effort through monitoring. For 
these two contract types, renegotiation can incentivize 
the provider’s effort, and as the provider’s bargaining 
power in renegotiation increases, the latter is more 
willing to exert effort. When the provider has high bar-
gaining power, renegotiation incentivizes the provider 
and the client will prefer a fixed-price contract. When 
the provider has low bargaining power and the per unit 
cost of monitoring is low though, the client will use 
monitoring as a complement to stimulate the provider 
and select a time-and-materials contract. When the 
provider has low bargaining power and the per unit 
cost of monitoring is high, renegotiation will lead to 
high monitoring cost, which reduces the client’s profit 
in a time-and-materials contract. So a client will be 
better off choosing a fixed-price contract.  
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
describes the model settings. Section 4 examines 
fixed-price contract and time-and-materials contract 
respectively. Section 5 analyzes the client’s contract 
choice. Section 6 summarizes the findings and dis-
cusses modeling limitations and further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There has been increasing interest on software and 
IT outsourcing contracts in the IS literature. Dey et al. 
[10] and Cezar et al. [6] presented contract-theoretic 
models to analyze how to motivate the effort from pro-
vider(s). Lee et al. [20] examined the contract perfor-
mance when both the client and the provider make ef-
forts toward a common IT system. In addition, fixed-
price and time-and-materials contracts are two typical 
software outsourcing arrangements. Previous research 
compares the differences between the two contracts in 
transaction costs [3, 8] and incentive mechanisms [13]. 
However, almost all the analyses mentioned above 
viewed software outsourcing contracts as complete. In 
practice, contracting for software development out-
sourcing is inevitably incomplete [3] because it typi-
cally involves unforeseen contingencies [10], non-
contractible investments and behaviors [27], and im-
measurable performance [11].  Bhattacharya et al. [4] 
studied incomplete software outsourcing contracts 
with renegotiation, but they focused on designing a re-
negotiation-proof contract. Benaroch et al. [2] mod-
eled the implications of including a back-sourcing re-
negotiation option in a software outsourcing contract 
and specified the cost and value effects for the client 
and the provider. We will analyze the performance of 
incomplete software outsourcing contracts and inves-
tigate the impact of renegotiation on the client’s pref-
erences for a fixed-price contract or a time-and-mate-
rials contract. 
The economics literature on renegotiation is vast. 
Bolton and Dewatripont [5] identified two streams: re-
negotiation under adverse selection and renegotiation 
under moral hazard. In the former, a potential partici-
pant does not know the other party’s type before sign-
ing a contract. So contracts that are vulnerable to rene-
gotiation tend to be less efficient in solving the asym-
metric information problem between trading partners. 
Contracts that require the participants to commit to not 
renegotiate are better in this respect [9, 14]. In the lat-
ter, if the parties can take unilateral actions after sign-
ing a contract, then the main issue is the hold-up prob-
lem, in which the investing party fears expropriation 
of the investment benefits by its contracting partner in 
renegotiation, leading to underinvestment [7, 12]. Our 
work belongs to the latter stream but differs from it 
somewhat. Although the hold-up problem exists in 
both fixed-price contract and time-and-materials con-
tract, we will report that renegotiation may offer the 
provider additional incentive to invest in making more 
service-related effort.  
This research also relates to the literature on soft-
ware reliability. The Goel-Okumoto non-homogene-
ous Poisson process model is the most commonly-used 
software reliability prediction model [16]. Using this 
model as a starting point, Pham and Zhang [25] pre-
sented a software reliability-cost model to determine 
the optimal testing time. Jiang et al. [15] separated 
testing stopping time from system release time. They 
considered testing as continuing during system opera-
tion, that is, post-release testing. August and 
Niculescu [1] further examined the impact of software 
demand on post-release testing. In addition, Jiang et al. 
[16] considered both software reliability and market-
related benefits and derived not only the optimal test-
ing time but also the optimal number of testers. How-
ever, an implicit assumption made in all these studies 
above is that the system would be developed com-
pletely. They ignored that the provider also must make 
additional effort in the system development process. 
As a result, we will consider both the development and 
testing stages. After the provider develops the system, 
the parties may renegotiate testing time before doing 
this work. 
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3. Model 
 
Consider a setting in which a client outsources a 
customized information system from an IT service 
provider. The outsourcing services offered by the pro-
vider include three stages: system development, sys-
tem testing and system maintenance. In the system de-
velopment stage, the provider develops the system 
based on the prototype system, and the system quality 
is indicated by the number of bugs [10]. Assume the 
prototype system has an initial number of bugs , 
and the provider can exert effort  to 
decrease the bugs to , where  is a uni-
formly-distributed random variable on . Since 
there are always bugs that can be detected, we assume 
. The cost of the development effort e to 
the provider is , where c is the provider’s develop-
ment efficiency. We assume that the development 
time, which is decided on the basis of the provider’s 
past experience, is constant. The random noise  will 
be realized after the provider finishes system develop-
ment, so the number N can be observed when system 
development ends. 
In the system testing stage, the provider spends 
time t to detect system bugs with cost kt, and this pro-
cess satisfies the properties of the Goel-Okumoto 
model for software reliability, so the expected number 
of undetected bugs  for testing time t is: 
 , (1) 
where  represents the failure rate of each bug. The 
cost of fixing bugs detected during testing is 
 for the provider, where a is the cost of fix-
ing one bug in this stage. 
In the system maintenance stage, the system is de-
livered to the client and put into operation. The cost of 
maintenance is incurred by the provider when system 
failure occurs during operation. It includes the direct 
cost associated with identifying and fixing the bugs, 
the loss of revenue due to system downtime, and other 
costs. This cost also depends on the number of unde-
tected bugs . This is considered to be higher than 
the cost of fixing the same bugs if they are detected 
during the testing stage [15]. To facilitate the inclusion 
of this observation, we denote the cost of maintenance 
as  for the provider, where  is the added 
cost per bug during maintenance compared with that 
during testing. 
                                               
1 On the cost side,  represents the marginal cost of testing. On 
the benefit side, since ,  
Based on the above assumptions, the expected to-
tal cost for the provider is comprised of four parts: 
 , (2) 
From Equation 1, this also can be expressed as: 
 . (3) 
To exclude the unrealistic case in which testing time is 
negligible, we assume  to ensure the marginal 
benefit of testing is greater than its marginal cost.1 
The utility of the system to the client decreases 
with the total number of system bugs. Therefore, the 
total utility of the client can be expressed as: 
  (4) 
where  is the baseline utility if the system is bug-
free, and  is the client’s sensitivity to bugs in the sys-
tem. Further, after the system is developed and uncer-
tainty associated with  is resolved, the initial testing 
time determined by the expected total number of bugs 
may not be optimal. So after observing the realized 
, the client and the provider have incentives to renego-
tiate the initial testing time t to . The two parties will 
split the extra social surplus increment generated by 
the renegotiation, a renegotiation surplus. The shares 
of the renegotiation surplus obtained by the provider 
and the client are  and . Here, these also repre-
sent the relative bargaining power of the provider and 
the client in renegotiation.  
There are two contract types that the client can use 
to initiate software outsourcing with the provider: a 
fixed-price contract or a time-and-materials contract. 
In a fixed-price contract, a predetermined price, , 
is paid to the provider for system development, testing 
and maintenance services. In a time-and-materials 
contract, besides the payment for the services of the 
provider, , the client also must pay an extra fee for 
the provider’s effort. Thus, the transfer from the client 
to the provider in a time-and-materials contract is 
, where  is the effort that the pro-
vider reports and r is the reward based on effort. Since 
the provider’s effort level e is usually unobservable 
and non-contractible, the client must resort to monitor-
ing the provider to verify the reported effort . The 
client’s monitoring policy  is chosen on a scale of 
[0,1], which corresponds to the monitoring probability 
of effort made. A higher value of  indicates that the 
client will monitor a larger number of documents and 
processes. Similar to Dey et al. [10], the monitoring 
cost to the client depends on the monitoring policy
represents the marginal benefit of testing, because  is the ex-
pected rate of bug detection by the provider at time 0 and is the 
cost saving for each bug detected by the provider [15]. 
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, where  captures the per unit cost of monitoring. If 
the client finds that the provider has inflated his effort 
level, the client will impose a cheating penalty 
, where . This penalty can also 
be regarded as the cost of reputation loss and the sub-
sequent future business loss.  
The timing of events is as follows. At Stage 0, the 
client selects contract type, and if fixed-price contract 
is chosen, the client determines the contract term 
; if time-and-materials contract is chosen, the cli-
ent determines contract terms . At Stage 1, 
the provider decides the effort level  as well as the 
initial testing time  in a fixed-price contract, or the 
effort level  input to develop the system, the reported 
effort level  and initial testing time  in a time-and-
materials contract.  
At Stage 2, the system will have been developed 
and the uncertainty associated with the total number of 
bugs  will have been realized. The parties renegoti-
ate the initial testing time  to a new one at , and 
split the renegotiation surplus with the provider, thus 
getting a fraction  of it.  
At Stage 3, according to the renegotiated testing 
time , the provider will detect and fix the system 
bugs in the period [0, ]. Then, at Stage 4, the system 
will be delivered to the client and the provider will of-
fer system maintenance service.  
 
4. Contract Analysis 
 
We next examine the decisions of the client and the 
provider under a fixed-price contract and a time-and-
materials contract with renegotiation one-at-a-time. 
 
4.1. Fixed-Price Contract 
 
Under a fixed-price contract, the client first deter-
mines the payment  for software outsourcing ser-
vices at Stage 0. After observing the payment, the pro-
vider decides the initial testing time  and exerts ef-
fort  to develop the system at Stage 1. After system 
development, the two parties revise the initial testing 
time  to , and then the provider offers system test-
ing and system maintenance services. 
By backward induction, at Stage 2 the renegotia-
tion surplus  can be written as: 
    Dp(?̃?) = (-k?̃?-bN exp(-l?̃?) ) – (-kt-bN exp(-lt))      (5)  
                                               
2 All modeling analysis, unless stated, is in the Appendix. 
Optimizing Equation 5 over ?̃?, we obtain the opti-
mal renegotiated testing time: 
= (1/l) ln(lbN/k)                         (6) 
At Stage 1, given the fixed payment , the ex-
pected payoff for the provider are as follows, where 
superscript FP represents fixed-price contract and sub-
script P represents the provider. 
  (7) 
At Stage 0, anticipating the provider’s response in 
effort level and initial testing time, the client deter-
mines the payment  to maximize its own profits as 
follows. Subscript C represents the client. 
  (8) 
Assume the provider’s reservation profit is 0, and 
the individual rationality (IR) constraint is , 
which guarantees the minimum expected payoff of the 
provider to accept the contract. Define the thresholds, 
and
, where h(e)=(N0-e+j)ln(N0-e+j)-(N0-e-j)ln(N0-e-j). 
Here, the expression  depicts the renegotiation 
surplus relative to effort. We further define a threshold 
for the provider’s bargaining power as 
. Then, maximizing Equations 
7 and 8, we obtain:2 
• Proposition 1 (Fixed-Price Contract Effort 
and Testing Time) In a fixed-price contract, (i) 
if , and 
, then the optimal effort level  and 
the optimal initial testing time 
; (ii) if  
and , then 
 and . 
Proposition 1 shows that , which means that 
the renegotiation surplus increases in the provider’s ef-
fort in the system development stage. Thus, in turn, 
when the provider’s development efficiency is moder-
ate and the provider has high bargaining power in re-
negotiation, the provider ought to be willing to exert a 
high level of effort to obtain more benefit from rene-
gotiation. In other words, renegotiation can incentivize 
the provider’s effort, and as the provider’s bargaining 
power increases, it is more willing to exert effort. 
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4.2. Time-and-Materials Contract 
 
In a time-and-materials contract, the client first de-
termines the fixed payment , the per effort reward 
 and the monitoring policy . Then, the provider de-
cides his effort level , the reported effort level  and 
the initial testing time . After the total number of sys-
tem bugs  has been recognized, both parties rene-
gotiate initial testing time to , and share the renego-
tiation surplus according to their relative bargaining 
power. Thus, given the contract terms , the 
expected payoff for the provider, with superscript TM 
representing a time-and-materials contract, is: 
 (9) 
Anticipating the provider’s best response, the cli-
ent determines  to maximize profit via:3 
  (10) 
Note that in addition to the IR constraint, , 
the client further faces incentive compatibility (IC) 
constraints, , 
which ensure the provider is telling the truth about ef-
fort. Maximizing Equations 9 and 10, we obtain the 
optimal decisions of the two parties under the time-
and-materials contract in Proposition 2. 
• Proposition 2 (Time-and-Materials Contract 
Initial Testing Time and Monitoring Policy). In 
a time-and-materials contract, 
 (i) if and  
, then the optimal initial 
testing time , the opti-
mal effort level , and  the optimal mon-
itoring policy ;  
(ii) if   and
, then
, , and 
; 
(iii) if , then ,
, and ; 
                                               
3 The penalty for cheating  is the cost of reputation loss 
and future business loss for the provider, but does not enter into the 
(iv) otherwise, then , , 
and . 
Proposition 2 suggests that, apart from renegotia-
tion, in the time-and-materials contract, the client can 
stimulate the provider’s effort via monitoring. When 
the increased renegotiation surplus generated by the 
provider’s effort cannot cover the development cost 
directly associated with the provider’s effort, the pro-
vider will exert a low level of effort to develop the sys-
tem. However, meanwhile, the high level of effort may 
create more profit for the client than a low level of ef-
fort will. This leads the client to incentivize the pro-
vider by implementing a policy with a high degree of 
monitoring for the time-and-materials contract. On the 
other hand, if the provider has high (low) development 
efficiency, where it is easier (more difficult) for the 
provider to improve system quality, the client’s moni-
toring policy  and a time time-and-materials 
contract degenerates into a fixed-price contract. 
 
5. Contract Choice 
 
We now examine the contract choice between 
fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts for the 
client. Comparing the client’s profit in the two contract 
types, we offer the third proposition. We define an-
other two thresholds for the provider’s bargaining 
power,  and 
, and a threshold 
for the per unit cost of monitoring, 
. 
• Proposition 3 (Testing Time Renegotiation 
Contract Choice). When testing time renegotia-
tion is considered, the client will choose a time-
and-materials contract over a fixed-price con-
tract if , or if
; otherwise, a 
fixed-price contract will be preferred. 
Figure 1 illustrates the results of Proposition 3.  
When the provider has high bargaining power, as in 
Region I, renegotiation incentivizes the provider’s ef-
fort and weakens the effect of monitoring in stimulat-
ing the provider’s effort, which leads the client to 
choose a fixed-price contract. When the provider has 
low bargaining power and the per unit cost of monitor-
ing is low, as in Region II, the effect of renegotiation 
for incentivizing the provider’s effort is more limited. 
Thus, to obtain more benefit from renegotiation, the 
client’s profit function, since it is not an earnings benefit that the 
client gets in practice [10]. 
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client will use monitoring as a complement to incen-
tivize the provider’s effort and a time-and-materials 
contract will become the preferred choice.  
 
 
Figure 1. Client’s Contract Choice 
In Region III, when the provider has low bargain-
ing power and the per unit cost of monitoring is high, 
at  and , again the beneficial effect of 
renegotiation to incentivize the provider’s effort will 
be limited. Thus, to achieve more benefit from rene-
gotiation, the client will reward a high value for  to 
the provider to incentivize the provider’s effort. How-
ever, high value of will lead to a high degree of mon-
itoring with a high monitoring cost for the implemen-
tation of that policy. This reduces the benefit of moni-
toring, resulting in a different conclusion: a fixed-price 
contract is better than a time-and-materials contract.  
Also  equals , 
which means that the provider’s development effi-
ciency is low. Thus, the provider will be reluctant to 
make an effort due to the high cost of development, 
and both renegotiation and monitoring cannot incen-
tivize the provider’s effort. Meanwhile, a time-and-
materials contract will degenerate into a fixed-price 
contract and the client will select the latter contract. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We established a multi-stage model where a client 
outsources a customized information system from a 
provider, and examined fixed-price and time-and-ma-
terials contracts. We focused on the impacts of testing 
time renegotiation on the client’s preference for the 
contract types. Our analysis showed that compared 
with a fixed-price contract, a time-and-materials con-
tract stimulates the provider’s effort better due to mon-
itoring. In both contracts, renegotiation can incentivize 
the provider’s effort. As the provider’s bargaining 
power in renegotiation increases, the provider is more 
willing to exert effort to develop the system. When the 
provider has high bargaining power, renegotiation of-
fers a greater incentive and the client will prefer a 
fixed-price contract. When the provider has low bar-
gaining power and the per unit cost of monitoring is 
low, however, the client will use monitoring to stimu-
late the provider and will choose a time-and-materials 
contract. And when the provider has low bargaining 
power and the per unit cost of monitoring is high, re-
negotiation leads to high monitoring cost, which 
causes the client to prefer a fixed-price contract.  
Though research on software outsourcing contracts 
with renegotiation is in a nascent stage [2], there are a 
number of avenues that can be addressed by future re-
search. To begin with, we assumed that renegotiation 
is costless. Future research should explore how rene-
gotiation cost affects the client’s contract choice. Next, 
it is of particular interest to investigate the impact of 
renegotiation on the value of information. Since the 
client can observe the performance of effort and rene-
gotiate the initial contract ex post, the value of infor-
mation will decrease. However, there is a possibility 
that the value of information will increase. This is be-
cause it can amplify the effect that the provider’s pri-
vate information reduces the client’s profit, while re-
negotiation can increase the total surplus. Last, if there 
are two or more potential providers, then it is also in-
teresting to study the effect of competition on the con-
tract with renegotiation. This mimics real software 
outsourcing and has contract choice implications.  
 
Appendix A1. Fixed-Price Contract 
  
From Eqs. 5 and 6, Eqs. 7 and 8 can be written as:  
  (A1) 
  (A2) 
In Eq. A1,  is determined by FOC . Then 
substituting  into Equation A1 and com-
paring the value of  and , the optimal deci-
sions for the provider can be derived. Next in Eq. A2, when 
the IR constraint binds, the client has maximal profit. So, 
. 
We next define the function: . By the 
Hadamard inequality, we have , 
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where . Therefore, 
. And then, 
, which suggests that . 
 
Appendix A2. Time-and-Materials Contract 
 
From Eqs. 5 and 6, Eqs. 9 and 10 can be written as:  
    (A3)
 (A4) 
First, the IC constraints should be satisfied, because the 
client prefers to deter the developer from cheating. Thus, the 
client offers an incentive compatible contract with . In 
Eq. A3, due to the constraints , we have .  
is determined by the first-order condition . Then 
substituting  and  into Eq. A3 and 
comparing the value of  and , the optimal 
decision for the provider can be derived.  Next in Equation 
A4, the IR constraint is binding, so then we have the optimal 
payment . The constraint (IC-L) is binding so that 
is observed. And substituting 
 into Eq. A4, we have:  
(A5).  
Solving Eq. A5, the optimal decisions for the client in a 
time-and-materials contract then can be derived. 
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